Concierto "La Inclusión Son Muchas Voces"

Concierto: La Inclusión son Muchas Voces.

 

"El Grito de la Última Hoja al Tocar El Suelo".

Se quedó calvo el árbol bueno,
Fenecieron los sueños que sus hojas cobijaron,
Traicionero el viento de otoño,
Arrancó los nidos,
Arrasó y causó el mayor de los daños.

Tenía una figura como ninguna,
Se veía sólido con las hojas en sus ramas,
Al final quedo sin vida,
Al final murió víctima de algo similar al veneno para las hadas.

No hay esperanza para ese árbol ya viejo,
Viejo no por el tiempo,
Viejo por el daño sufrido en un breve lapso con sabor a ajenjo,
Ya se encuentra el tronco exánime, anémico,
Su esencia se esfumó,
Con el grito de la última hoja al tocar el suelo.

Por: Francisco Pérez, "Frasko".

El Ex Gallo de Oro.

El 2 de julio de 2006 es una fecha que Marcelo Ebrard debe de atesorar en su memoria. Él fue candidato oficial del Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) para ocupar –mediante elecciones- la posición que anteriormente fuera de Andrés Manuel López Obrador y Alejandro Encinas. El dedo lopezobradorista escogió a su “gallo”, y ganó.

Anteriormente este personaje fue Secretario de Seguridad Pública y posteriormente de Desarrollo Social en el DF, durante el periodo de López Obrador al frente del Gobierno de la llamada “Ciudad de la Esperanza”, además fue consejero político del tabasqueño. Ebrard Casaubón también fue hombre muy cercano a Manuel Camacho Solís por allá de principios de los noventas, cuando ambos militaban en el Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI).

Una carrera política, que entre otras acciones, tiene en su haber la creación del Partido de Centro Democrático, así como una diputación independiente y pronunciamientos en contra de la constitución del FOBAPROA.

Aquel personaje que gozó de la confianza máxima del actual dirigente del Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional (MORENA), el día de hoy se apuntala como posible candidato de la Izquierda mexicana rumbo a las elecciones de 2012. Lo curioso del asunto, enfrente tiene como competidor, a aquel que le diera predilección seis años atrás.

En fechas recientes Marcelo fue presidente de la CONAGO; en 2010 recibió el premio al mejor alcalde del mundo; También ha sido responsabilizado directamente por grupos de Derechos Humanos de la tragedia del antro-bar New’s Divine, donde fallecieron 12 personas. Asimismo, la polémica ley que permite el aborto en el Distrito Federal, es uno los señalamientos por los cuales Marcelo Ebrard ha estado bajo la mira de diversos grupos que van en pro de la vida. Otro punto de crítica es la construcción de la llamada “súper vía”.

El actual Jefe de Gobierno del D.F., a quien señalan como posible candidato a la presidencia en 2012 -adjetivo que el mismo reconoció ya en más de una ocasión-, no ve con malos ojos alguna coalición entre partidos con miras a dichas elecciones. Su carrera política nos demuestra que no es un hombre apegado a un partido, por lo que no se debe descartar que en caso de presentarse una oportunidad de abanderarse para representar a un bloque, lo hará sin pensar que uno de sus principales adversarios, será el mismo que le dio vida y proyección política un sexenio atrás.

La ventaja competitiva que posee Marcelo es evidente. Los reflectores están sobre él y tiene cautivo el voto de la abundante clase media de la capital del país. Los habitantes de esta ciudad no olvidan el cierre de Reforma, lo cual seguramente permeará en una preferencia electoral por el actual Jefe de Gobierno.

Las candidaturas internas del Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) comienzan a destaparse, lo cual sin duda alguna será motivo de análisis por parte de Ebrard, ya que es un hecho, ninguno de los que ostentan el abanderamiento blanquiazul –a menos que alguno reciba apoyo directo del ejecutivo- posee por fuerza propia el impacto mediático del Perredista.

No dudemos en que las elecciones internas del PAN queden como solo un acto protocolario, para que después -dependiendo el nivel de las aguas peñanietistas y el calor de las demás campañas-, se de una coalición con el “hijo pródigo” de Andrés Manuel López Obrador, con la finalidad de impedir la llegada del PRI a los pinos.

De amigos a prácticamente adversarios, incluso ya con pronunciamientos de AMLO en contra de su pupilo, el camino a 2012 luce violento y lleno de dudas. Así es la política mexicana.

Por: Francisco Pérez "Frasko" || @Fraskote

Rumbo a 2012: "La Alternancia Herida y el Dinosaurio Fenix".

La izquierda mexicana, esa que vio un "rayito de esperanza" hace 14 años cuando se venció por primera vez en el Distrito Federal al dinosaurio, hoy simplemente no ve la luz.

El partido de oposición blanquiazul que se levantó con la victoria en las elecciones del año 2000 de la mano de Vicente Fox, y que presagiaba un cambio en la forma de hacer gobierno, con un paso adelante dentro de la vida democrática de México, hoy se queda en azul... muy claro, lastimado y entumido.

Justo hoy estamos a un año de que el país se vuelva a llenar de publicidad -impresa con la cara de los candidatos- colgando de los postes de luz; de que los ahora -medios alternativos- como las redes sociales, publicaciones online, entre otros, y los medios tradicionales, como la televisión y radio, comiencen el bombardeo propagandista de ilusiones y promesas de cambio.

Al día de hoy existe un candidato que ya se siente en la silla presidencial -con todo y primera dama-; hoy los dinosaurios se recuperan del meteorito que los privó de los rayos del sol; hoy la gente no cree en PAN ni en PRD, ni en ninguno de los parásitos partidos que los acompañan en sus batallas con el afán de no perder el registro como partido. Si las elecciones fueran hoy, Enrique Peña Nieto sería el Presidente de México, y con ello, el regreso de uno de los grupos políticos más fuertes: "El Grupo Atlacomulco".

¿Cómo planean tanto la izquierda, como la derecha mexicanas no permitir que su lucha de tantos años se la lleve el viento? ¿Cuál será la estrategia para enfrentar a un político que ocupa los medios de comunicación más grandes de este país a su favor? ¿Cómo quitar de la percepción de la gente que regresar a esa historia de "gobiernos asesinos de estudiantes" y de "políticos que pactan con el narcotráfico", no es la mejor opción?

¿De que forma borrar de la memoria del electorado: El plantón de Reforma, los más de 40,000 muertos, los niños de la guardería ABC, el desafuero, los linchados de Tlahuac, Bejarano, el endeudamiento del D.F., los dimes y diretes soberbios de falsos mesías, Hildebrando, Marisela Escobedo, Yeidckol Polevnsky, Carlos Ahumada, Martha Sahagún, entre muchos otros casos? ¿Cómo decirle a la sociedad lo contrario a los resultados obtenidos después de 14 años de alternancia en el México post institucionalista revolucionario?

Ahí amigos lectores, en las respuestas a las preguntas que se plantean, está gran parte de la estrategia para lograr que la gente no vote por el viejo conocido y si por el mas o menos nuevo ideal, que al día de hoy lo único que hace es disputarse el poder en forma absurda y carroñera, tal y como lo han hecho PRD, PAN, PT, Convergencia, Panal y demás partidos políticos y movimientos "renacentistas", que lejos de buscar el diálogo entre ellos, se han dedicado a tirarse estiércol unos a otros, bajo la premisa de que si están en contra de ellos o no se está de acuerdo en sus planes, son mafiosos, malos, y hasta traicioneros.

Por: Francisco Pérez "Frasko". 

Reflexiones de la Marcha Nacional.

Cinco minutos de silencio por los más de cuarenta mil muertos, horas de transitar por las calles del Distrito Federal de una marcha que comenzó en Cuernavaca, lágrimas que en sus líquidos cuerpos reflejan el dolor del alma de un pueblo lacerado por la impunidad, la violencia y la falta de atención por parte de los órganos de gobierno.

La palabra impotencia pudiera describir el sentimiento de todos y cada uno de aquellos que se subieron al templete a dar testimonio de sus tragedias y que contagiaron a muchos de los que ahí estuvimos. Gritos de una sociedad que exige un cambio en la política armamentista de un presidente que quiso legitimarse a través del uso de las armas, encontrando en la guerra su preciado capital político.

Sería una gran mentira decir que no hubo presencia de diferentes frentes  entre los que puedo mencionar a gente muy cercana al proyecto MORENA, así como miembros del SME y simpatizantes del EZLN. También vale la pena mencionar que organizaciones como GREENPEACE, Amnistía Internacional, Periodistas Sin Fronteras, así como grupos que defienden los derechos humanos y grupos de personas con preferencias sexuales diferentes se dieron cita al lugar y avanzamos juntos. El grupo fue multicultural, con la presencia de jóvenes de la UNAM, UACM, IPN, UAM, así como de muchos otros que demostraron de diversas formas su preocupación ante el actual estado de descomposición social que vivimos. La consigna: Manifestar inconformidad ante la política militar que prevalece en diversos estados del país, así como la búsqueda de regenerar el tejido social.

Pero, ¿qué ganamos con llevar a las calles a cientos de miles de personas? ¿En qué momento se capitalizará el esfuerzo de todas esas personas que de la mano de Javier Sicilia avanzamos hasta el Zócalo capitalino? Las respuestas a estas dos preguntas no tienen una respuesta en el corto, e incluso en el mediano plazo. La marcha debe de ser vista como el comienzo de una reformación civil. Las exigencias fueron claras y para nada tendientes a reforzar a algún partido político o a algún proyecto alternativo de nación específico. La marcha no fue declarada ni de Izquierda ni de Derecha, sino por el contrario, con la única dirección de exigir las garantías constitucionales de vida digna.

Los seis puntos que se incluyen en el texto del pacto nacional, que fueron leídos y recalcados por Sicilia y compañía son extremadamente claros, no pedimos imposibles. El discurso tocó varios puntos relacionados con dicho pacto, entre otras palabras que mezcladas con la sabia lírica del poeta, despertaron en más de uno la sensación patriótica perdida por la nefasta cultura de la indiferencia.  El dolor de un padre convertido en reclamo.

Un punto importantísimo dentro del Pacto y que debe de atenderse a la brevedad es el que dice claramente que se debe de “romper el control corporativo del Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación, dirigido por Elba Esther Gordillo, que en vez de funcionar como unidad magisterial suprema, sirve de capital negociable para los partidos políticos, comom lo fue en el año 2006.

Sicilia dijo: “Esta casa donde habita el horror no es el México de Salvador Nava, de Heberto Castillo, de Manuel Clouthier, de los hombres y mujeres de las montañas del sur -de esos pueblos mayas que engarzan su palabra a la nación- y de tantos otros que nos han recordado la dignidad, pero sí lo es”. Dichas palabras han sido manipuladas al antojo de los poderes fácticos a los cuales también hizo referencia. Si bien, algunos de los nombres son de políticos Panistas, llevan en cada letra la representación de la oposición contra el poder que en aquellas épocas imperaba en Los Pinos. Ese mismo poder del cual Felipe Calderón se quejó y tacho de injusto. Paradójico, ahora el que no escucha y emite juicios contra quien no sigue su discurso aparece día a día en su espejo.

Otro párrafo que me sigue haciendo eco es el siguiente: “Queremos afirmar aquí que no aceptaremos más una elección si antes los partidos políticos no limpian sus filas de esos que, enmascarados en la legalidad, están coludidos con el crimen y tienen al Estado maniatado y cooptado al usar los instrumentos de éste para erosionar las mismas esperanzas de cambio de los ciudadanos”.  Aquellos como Tomás Yarrington, ex gobernador de Tamaulipas, y ahora Alejandro Encinas protector de Julio César Godoy Toscano quien es medio hermano del gobernador de Michoacán y socio del narcotraficante  “La Tuta”. El mismo Calderón coludido en el escándalo de Hildebrando, sin olvidar al ex candidato presidencial Arturo Montiel, que nunca ha pagado ninguno de los crímenes de los que fue acusado. Delincuentes todos ellos de cuello blanco.

Asimismo, desligó a la marcha de cualquier filiación política, lo cual me parece más que correcto, una granada para todos aquellos que quisieran capitalizar de alguna forma el movimiento puro que significó el organizar a la sociedad civil a participar y despertar su compromiso ciudadano.

Los invito a leer tanto el pacto nacional, como las palabras que dijo el Maestro Sicilia, ya que si bien, como lo recalco y afirmo con la frialdad que impera en esta triste realidad, la solución muy probablemente no quedará en este sexenio, pero si puede convertirse en precedente para que sea parte de la agenda legislativa de los que están por comenzar sus respectivas campañas.

Lo más importante queda en lo que cada uno de nosotros podamos aportar a la sociedad. Nosotros somos la materia prima de la nación, asumamos la responsabilidad histórica de apoyar este tipo de movimientos sociales sin fines específicos de partidos, que dicho sea de paso, esas instituciones llenan sus bolsillos con dinero del erario público y no actúan de forma honesta, justa, equitativa y digna.

Seamos parte de ese cambio de mentalidad de la cultura de la indiferencia, vivamos nuestra democracia no solamente asistiendo a votar a las urnas, sino también, participando activamente en la elaboración de propuestas y demostración de inconformidad cuando una política, como la armamentista de Calderón, día a día matan a cientos de mexicanos.

Esperemos y que no sea cuando tengan que experimentar la muerte de algún familiar cercano, el momento en que “les caiga el veinte” como decimos coloquialmente. Sumemos esfuerzos, no permitamos la división social que los partidos políticos han provocado. Lleguemos a acuerdos, que solo así se construyen grandes naciones.

México Patina

¿Nostalgia? Si, un poco. Asistir al primer concurso de skateboarding organizado por AMPA México, fue como subirme a un Delorean.

Recuerdo el año de 1997, en el cual comencé mis estudios de preparatoria. Justo en aquellas épocas nació mi gusto por las patinetas y el graffiti. 

Vagos, delincuentes, borrachos, gente sin oficio ni beneficio, entre muchos otros divertidos, pero ofensivos adjetivos, se utilizaban para describir a alguien que se atrevía a andar por las calles con su patineta. Me dio un gusto enorme ver que esos mal llamados "vagos", el día de hoy forman parte de los atletas que representan a diversas importantes marcas.

Pudiera escribir mil y un historias que ejemplificarían perfectamente como el paso de los años y la ruptura de ciertos mitos que los acompañan, han posicionado al Skateboarding como un deporte reconocido en México, pero no se trata de eso este post. 

Asistir a un concurso como el del sábado 30 de abril de 2011, me dejó en extremo contento (independientemente de los Whiskeys que muy amablemente nos proporcionaron). Ver materializado el esfuerzo de mucha gente que lleva años picando piedra y luchando por que su deporte, nuestro deporte (aunque lo haya dejado de practicar por ser extremadamente malo para realizarlo),  reciba gran atención, es motivo de festejo. 

No quise dejar pasar desapercibido en mi blog dicho evento, ya que la integración social de la juventud mexicana que se puede lograr haciéndola participe de un deporte que por definición es parte de la cultura underground, es totalmente viable. 

La cultura del skateboarding va más allá de patinar, implica esfuerzos adicionales e incluso, cultura entrepreneur. Muchas de las tiendas donde se venden artículos para realizar este deporte han sido iniciadas por los mismos atletas. El apoyar este tipo de actividades genera posibilidades de crecimiento, auto empleo, que por consiguiente alejan de actividades delictivas a los jóvenes, enfocándolos en tener una mentalidad realmente emprendedora, y con actitud de constancia y dedicación. 

En verdad fue un honor estar ahí, viendo como al igual que la música independiente, el skateboarding en México crece y se convierte en una alternativa y un modus vivendi para quien realmente trabaja y hace las cosas bien, con dedicación y pasión. 

Una muestra más de que las generaciones tienen que seguir despertando, además de  que pueden convertir sus aspiraciones y pasatiempos en algo rentable para ellos. 

Larga vida a la cultura del Skateboarding en México. 

 

El Binomio Chapo-Calderón.

Para todos aquellos que se pregutan si la ola de violencia se detendrá, al parecer, de acuerdo al informe que presenta Stratfor, eso no será posible por diferentes factores. Uno de ellos, es que no es prioridad del Gobierno de Felipe Calderón detener la guerra. 

En días recientes se publicó en la página de Stratfor (http://www.stratfor.com/) un estudio en el que se concluye que el Cartel de Sinaloa, dirigido por Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán, será el más benficiado con el actual estado de guerra que se libra en México.

En dicho informe se hace un estudio detallado de cada uno de los Cárteles que controlan el narcotráfico en México, así como un análisis del futuro a corto y mediano plazo relacionado con la violencia en nuestro país, el cual desafortunadamente, no es muy alentador. 

Entre muchos otros datos, además de los que el periódico La Jornada publicó en una nota el viernes 22 de abril, me llamó mucho la atención un párrafo donde se habla de los hechos perpetrados por integrantes de Los Zetas en contra de agentes estadounidenses en Febrero de 2011. A manera de contextualizar dicho párrafo, se hace una remembranza de la "Operación Leyenda" que se llevó a cabo hace 26 años, con la cual agentes del gobierno de los EEUU prácticamente aniquilaron al Cartel de Guadalajara en respuesta al asesinato de un miembro especial de las fuerzas norteamericanas de nombre Enrique "Kiki" Camarena.

Lo anterior, pareciera ser una advertencia, de un mayor número de posibles operaciones norteamericanas en territorio mexicano, con el pretexto del agente asesinado en el mes de Febrero pasado. 

Con respecto al Cartel de Sinaloa, el reporte Stratfor dice lo siguiente: "Sigue siendo el mayor y más coherente de los carteles mexicanos". Lo anterior me pareció una forma de subrayar la importancia de dicha organización, y la importancia que puede tomar en futuros meses, no descartando posibles nexos con el Presidente Felipe Calderón.

Después de leer todo el informe, no me deja de pasar por la cabeza una y otra vez la película de "El Padrino" de Francis Ford Coppola. Una intensa lucha por el control de territorios y de diversificar ingresos, aunado al control hegemónico que puede ejercer una organización, son las constantes que me llevan a comparar a la "Familia Corleone" con el Cartel de Sinaloa. 

De acuerdo al Informe, tal pareciera que el Gobierno de Felipe Calderón trata de "impulsar" al Cartel encabezado por "El Chapo" Guzmán, y de esa forma, mantener aplacados a los demás Cárteles y organizaciones tales como Los Zetas y Los Caballeros Templarios.

Esta realidad que pareciera extraida de la imaginación de Mario Puzo -tropicalizada al entorno mexicano- se vislumbra no terminará con un final feliz y si con un número más grande de mexicanos muertos. No estamos hablando de buenos ni de malos; estamos hablando de MEXICANOS, que por las carencias del Sistema Económico y Político de nuestro país, se han visto en la necesidad de aceptar empleos bajo el mandato de las organizaciones delictivas.

Me es muy triste leer, que de acuerdo al artículo de Stratfort, el fututo de Monterrey depende en gran medida de la respuesta del Gobierno Federal en contra del grupo de Los Zetas, o de que el Cartel de Sinaloa brinde un apoyo mayor al Cartel del Golfo para poder replegar a dicho grupo que anteriormente trabajaba para ellos y que de no darse ninguna de las 2 situaciones, es muy probable, la ola de violencia siga.

La importancia que comienza a cobrar el binomio Chapo-Calderón, pareciera ser algo que rumbo a las elecciones de 2012 pudiera capitalizarse. No me suena tan descabellada la idea de que pudieran negociar un alto al fuego (tal y como pasó en la película de "El Padrino", cuando se reunen las "Familias" a pactar un alto a la violencia entre ellas) y tomar dicho periodo de Paz como bandera Panista. 

Por nuestra parte, la Sociedad Civil debemos de mantenernos en pie de lucha, exigiendo a nuestros gobernantes justicia para todos aquellos mexicanos que han fallecido víctimas de la barbarie que se vive actualmente. Es mi pensar que no debemos doblar las manos, ni bajar la cabeza, aunque el futuro parezca poco alentador. Somos más el número de mexicanos que "Estamos hasta la madre" de la falta de respuestas a nuestras exigencias. Sigamos sumando esfuerzos, sigamos mostrando que el miedo y la indiferencia no nos harán sucumbir ante las presiones provocadas por un estado fallido e irresponsable. 

Sigamos apoyando propuestas nuevas. En estos momentos, la legalización del consumo de sustancias prohíbidas toma mayor fuerza y debemos de analizarla bajo un marco jurídico congruente y realista.

¡Ni uno más! ¡Ya Basta! 

Francisco Pérez "Frasko"

PLUS: Les dejo el texto que me llegó por mail titulado "Cartel Report 2011".


Editor’s Note: Since the publication of STRATFOR’s 2010 annual Mexican cartel report, the fluid nature of the drug war in Mexico has prompted us to take an in-depth look at the situation more frequently. This is the first product of those interim assessments, which we will now make as needed, in addition to our annual year-end analyses and our weekly security memos.

In the first three months of 2011, overall violence across Mexico continued to rise. The drug cartels are fighting for control of lucrative ports of entry along the U.S. border and strategic choke points in the interior of Mexico — urban crossroads on both major and minor smuggling routes. These crossroads include cities like Ciudad Victoria, San Luis Potosi, Mexico City, Monterrey, Guadalajara, Durango, Torreon, Saltillo and Chihuahua. Some of them are important because they straddle vital north-south routes running along the coastlines. Others have strategic value because they sit on major highways that serve as direct routes through the interior of the country, from various points on the Pacific coast to ports of entry on the Texas border. And along that border, the control of plazas that have border crossings is being hotly contested from Juarez to Matamoros on the Gulf of Mexico.

The Gulf cartel, still battling its former enforcer arm Los Zetas, is holding on to Matamoros, a vital Gulf asset. With the Sinaloa Federation’s help, the Gulf cartel has repelled Zeta offensives both at Matamoros and Reynosa but has not displayed the force necessary to push Los Zetas out of Monterrey. Los Zetas, suffering the loss of 11 mid- to upper-level leaders and plaza bosses, continue to fight their primary war with the Gulf cartel while training and assisting allied cartels in Juarez, Tijuana and Acapulco.
The Vicente Carrillo Fuentes (VCF) cartel is managing to keep Sinaloa forces at bay in Juarez but has lost its outlying territories in Chihuahua state as well as its primary drug supply line from Chihuahua City. Sinaloa’s effective blockade of Juarez has begun to choke off VCF’s supply and revenue flow. VCF is not yet out of the game, but it is limping noticeably. Another cartel on the decline — a shadow of its former self — is the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO, aka the Tijuana cartel). AFO has very little territory left that it holds alone and is now subservient to the Sinaloa Federation, to which it pays for the right to access the California ports of entry.
The Cartel Pacifico Sur (CPS) and the Independent Cartel of Acapulco (CIDA), both of which comprise splinter factions of the former Beltran Leyva Organization, are battling each other for control of Acapulco’s seaport. CPS is the more successful of the two, with its territorial control stretching north along the Gulf of California coast into Sonora state, though smuggling corridors up the coastline are regularly disputed by the Sinaloa Federation.
After what seemed to be the sudden death of La Familia Michoacana (LFM) in January, it is now apparent that a portion of LFM of undetermined size has rebranded itself as the Knights Templar, which emerged on the scene in mid-March. Other members of LFM continue to operate under that name. This development is very new and it is not clear yet who the Knights Templar leaders are, how many are in the new group, what kind of relationship they have with their former brethren in LFM and what, if any, relationship either group has with the Sinaloa Federation. A great deal likely depends on the willingness of Sinaloa and Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman Loera to allow LFM or the Knights Templar to re-establish their former infrastructure and smuggling routes.
As for the Sinaloa Federation, it is now the regional hegemon in the western half of Mexico and is actively expanding its territory. Currently there are Sinaloa forces helping the Gulf cartel battle Los Zetas in the northeast, slowly strangling the VCF in Juarez, running the show in Tijuana and fighting for supremacy in Acapulco. Wherever there is a conflict in Mexico between or among a cartel’s current or former factions, you will find Sinaloa’s helpful hand. And in every case Sinaloa is gaining territory. While internal strife and external pressure from the Mexican military and federal law enforcement agencies have weakened all of the other cartels, the Sinaloa Federation has proved impervious to the turmoil — and it is growing.
In the next three to six months, STRATFOR expects Sinaloa to lead the pack in the fights for Acapulco and Durango. However, Sinaloa has so much going on around Mexico that Guzman may redeploy some of his fighters — from regions already solidified under his control, such as Tijuana — to Durango and Acapulco to facilitate quicker, more decisive victories there. STRATFOR anticipates an even greater level of violence in Juarez as Sinaloa’s chokehold tightens, and we expect to see a major push by Los Zetas to recover control of Reynosa, where the Gulf cartel will lose its hold if Sinaloa pulls fighters from there to fight elsewhere. Los Zetas are highly likely to hold onto Monterrey in the near term, absent a major government push or a massive effort by Gulf and Sinaloa, which is unlikely at this point but cannot be ruled out.
The CIDA may fade out completely in the next three to six months, with its remaining territory and assets likely split between the CPS, aided by Los Zetas, and Sinaloa. As for the Knights Templar, STRATFOR expects to see it pick up where LFM left off in December, though re-establishment of its methamphetamine production probably will be gradual.

Current Status of the Mexican Cartels

Los Zetas

Los Zetas have had setbacks over the last three months — reduced territory, captured or killed regional leaders, internal control issues — but the organization appears to be able to absorb such losses. Los Zetas have maintained control of their strongholds in Monterrey and Nuevo Laredo as well as the key Gulf of Mexico port of Veracruz, despite the best efforts of the Gulf cartel and elements of the New Federation. STRATFOR sources indicate that the Gulf cartel maintains constant surveillance of all roads leading to Matamoros, making a Zeta move in that direction difficult at best and at this point unlikely. It is more likely that Los Zetas will make a concerted effort to retake Reynosa in the coming months.
Since the beginning of 2011, actions by the Mexican military and federal police have resulted in the loss of at least 11 mid- to upper-level Los Zetas leaders, including Flavio “El Amarillo” Mendez Santiago, one of the original founding members, captured by federal police in Oaxaca on Jan. 18. One of seven Zeta gunmen killed Jan. 25 by Mexican soldiers during a running gunbattle through the Monterrey metropolitan area was identified only as “Comandante Lino,” who is believed to have been the top Zeta leader in Nuevo Leon state.
STRATFOR has heard rumors of a split between Los Zetas leader Heriberto “El Lazca” Lazcano Lazcano and No. 3 leader Miguel “Z-40” Trevino Morales. However, we have not been able to confirm this or determine if the attrition of secondary leaders was affected — or caused — by such a division.
One of the most significant events involving Los Zetas since December 2010 was the Feb. 15 attack against two U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents. The motivation for the attack remains unclear, but viewed against documented Zeta operational behaviors and priorities, it clearly was not consistent with the top leadership’s doctrine and past practices. There has been much speculation regarding the attackers’ motives, but a planned and sanctioned attack against U.S. officials would be certain to bring the full weight of the U.S. government onto the perpetrators, and that is not something the top Zeta leadership would want to invite. This suggests the possibility that lower-level regional leaders either lost control of their operational cells or actually condoned and/or ordered the attack.
Regarding the possibility of neglected control, the erosion of Zeta forces through battle, targeted assassination and capture has been high over the past year. There have been numerous indications that recent Zeta recruits have tended to be younger and less experienced than those who joined prior to 2010. The attrition in leadership has also resulted in leaders who are themselves younger and less experienced. Such a mix may be creating conditions in which young men equipped with vehicles and weapons but with little discipline or oversight are left to their own devices.
A number of mid-level Zeta leaders came from military and law enforcement backgrounds and had received some level of institutional training and education. But many of them likely do not grasp the gravity — or even know about — an incident 26 years ago, when the Guadalajara cartel kidnapped, tortured and killed Enrique “Kiki” Camarena, a special agent with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. In response, the U.S. government orchestrated the annihilation of the Guadalajara cartel in a massive offensive called Operation Leyenda. It is possible that certain midlevel Zetas, lacking knowledge or appreciation of that operation, may not be aware of the potential repercussions of an attack on known U.S. government personnel.
If that is the case, there may be a few sporadic attacks on U.S. government agents in the coming months. But unless such events go unanswered by U.S. agencies, thereby lending the cartels a sense of impunity, it is doubtful that more than a handful of such attacks will occur.
To some extent, out-of-control gunmen within Los Zetas are a self-solving problem. Rash actions by low-level Zetas can and do trigger the occasional harsh “house cleaning,” in which the transgressors, on the orders of top-level leaders, are either killed or betrayed to authorities to send a message to the rest of the organization. Either way, the internal problem weakens the cartel and reduces both its numbers and its organizational efficacy, and it is unlikely that the internal punishment of wayward Zetas protects the organization as a whole from the consequences of their actions.
Los Zetas’ current organizational dynamics suggest that we are likely to see more unsanctioned operations such as the ICE and Falcon Lake shootings. This obviously has implications for U.S. law enforcement personnel and innocent bystanders. Such operations also will continue to induce internal culling of the elements responsible for such attacks. In all likelihood, this internal pressure, when combined with external pressures brought against Los Zetas by their cartel rivals, the Mexican government and American authorities, will continue to take a heavy toll on the cartel. And as losses are replaced with younger and less-experienced operatives, ongoing violence and destabilization will likely erode Los Zetas’ power.

Gulf Cartel

Since late January, the Gulf cartel has been solidifying its hold on Matamoros. As both a northbound smuggling route into the United States and an inbound supply port for receiving waterborne shipments, Matamoros is vital to the Gulf cartel’s survival. The organization is not down for the count, but it continues to be weakened and dependent on its allies in the Sinaloa Federation to protect it from Los Zetas. With Los Zetas in control of the port of Veracruz, Matamoros serves as the cartel’s primary resupply point for Colombian cocaine, Central American arms shipments and other logistical operations. Certainly, Gulf cartel logistics are not constricted solely to that corner of Mexico, but seaport access enables large-volume resupply that minimizes the losses inherent in land routes through hostile areas.
Though Gulf cartel control encompasses Matamoros and Reynosa, both smuggling plazas with vital ports of entry on the border, the ownership of that territory has been contested. On Jan. 29, Los Zetas launched a sizable offensive that they had prepared in advance by placing resupply caches in and around Matamoros shortly after Antonio “Tony Tormenta” Cardenas Guillen was killed last November. Several weeks of heavy fighting flared up in Matamoros and to the south and west, as Zeta fighters hit Gulf cartel groups and Mexican military units took on both cartels. Smaller fights broke out along the border northwest to Nuevo Laredo as well as southward between Matamoros and Monterrey.
The fighting died down toward the end of February, and the Gulf cartel took the opportunity to ramp up revenue streams and restock. According to STRATFOR sources, cocaine seizures by U.S. law enforcement agencies rose steadily from mid-February to late March in the Rio Grande Valley portion of the south Texas border zone — a significant increase of high-value/low-volume contraband. To offset losses from the early February Zeta offensive, the Gulf cartel tried to bring in substantial revenue very quickly.
The upswing in cocaine smuggling corresponded with the lull in cartel battles and the need for quick cash. According to a Jan. 11 U.S. Department of Justice report on illicit drug prices, wholesale cocaine prices in the area were approximately $25,000 per kilogram (more than $11,000 per pound) versus $440 to $660 per kilogram for marijuana. There is no way to calculate the ratio of contraband seized to the total contraband smuggled in any given area at any given time, but various STRATFOR sources have made conservative estimates of 1:10 to 1:12 (seized to total smuggled). Since approximately 348 kilograms (767 pounds) of cocaine were seized between the last week of February and April 1, a reasonable extrapolation of the expected revenues — after the loss of the seized cocaine — would be $87 million.
The Gulf cartel leadership does not appear to have taken as big a loss as the Los Zetas leadership did in the first quarter. On March 4, however, authorities arrested Gustavo “El 85” Arteaga Zaleta and Pablo Jesus “El Enano” Arteaga Zaleta in Tampico, Tamaulipas. The brothers were wanted on charges of kidnapping, extortion, and arms and drug trafficking for the Gulf cartel in the states of Tamaulipas and San Luis Potosi. Secretariat of Public Security intelligence reports indicate that Gustavo Arteaga Zaleta is a former municipal policeman from Ciudad Madero, Tamaulipas, and was the “jefe de plaza” (plaza boss) in El Ebano, San Luis Potosi.
The loss of two Gulf cartel leaders over the past few months does not appear to have adversely affected the organization, though as a whole the cartel continues to be stretched thin. With federal forces occasionally entering the fray and Los Zetas seeking any weaknesses to exploit, the Gulf cartel is engaged in a large, bloody game of “whack-a-mole” in which its dual opponents further stretch its resources — augmented though it may be by Sinaloa elements.
While the Gulf cartel has held its territory and successfully repelled a Zeta offensive this past quarter, it has not been able to wrest Monterrey, Veracruz or Nuevo Laredo away from Zeta control. In northeast Mexico, the battle lines have not shifted, there are no clear winners and the violence will continue for the foreseeable future.

Sinaloa Federation

The Sinaloa Federation remains the largest and most cohesive of the Mexican cartels. Under the leadership of Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman Loera, Sinaloa has been steadily making inroads into the territories of other cartels, friend and foe alike. This expansion has been seen in Durango, Guerrero (specifically Acapulco and its vital seaport) and Michoacan states as well as Mexico City. Because it has remained a cohesive organization and maintained widely diversified revenue streams — from narcotics to avocados — the Sinaloa Federation stands to benefit most from the chaos across Mexico.
Only two significant members of the Sinaloa leadership were captured during the first quarter of 2011. The first was Cesar “El Placas” Villagran Salazar, arrested by army troops on Feb. 12. Villagran Salazar is alleged to be a key operator for Guzman in northern Sonora and coordinator of Sinaloa drug shipments for distribution across the border into Arizona. The second, on March 18, was Victor Manuel “El Senor” Felix, who is presumed to be a relative and confidante of Guzman and runs one of the cartel’s financial networks.
According to a STRATFOR source, the Mexican government’s current priority is getting the violence under control, not eliminating the cartels. It is a pragmatic approach. While some of the cartels may be breaking up or in the process of being absorbed, it is not possible at this point to eliminate them all — or to stop the trafficking of narcotics. Systemic corruption at all levels of government, well-entrenched for many years, turns a blind eye to cartel activities at best and enables them at worst. Apparently, the Mexican government has decided that the best course of action in this environment is to wage a war of attrition, taking out the low-hanging fruit and letting Sinaloa do the rest.
Extreme levels of violence are not in the best interests of cartels, whose primary goal is to make money. When violence goes up, revenue goes down. As the largest and most widespread Mexican cartel — incapable of being eliminated in the current environment — the Sinaloa Federation likely will continue to be relatively impervious to government efforts. It also is the organization most likely to assume the dominant position in the cartel landscape, which would enable it ultimately to impose a forced reduction in the cartel violence. Sinaloa could use its dominance to keep weaker groups in line, which would suit the government’s purposes.
As Sinaloa has steadily gained influence and territory over the past several years, its competition has been fragmenting. The destabilization that began in 2006 with Mexican President Felipe Calderon’s anti-cartel campaign thoroughly upset the cartel equilibrium and created power vacuums. With the possible exception of Los Zetas, the fragmentation and power vacuums have weakened or destroyed cartels while Sinaloa has either been unaffected or strengthened as the primary beneficiary. Even those elements within the Sinaloa Federation that were neutralized — the Beltran Leyva brothers and Ignacio “El Nacho” Coronel Villarreal — were elements that posed a potential challenge to the leadership of Sinaloa head Guzman.
In the case of the Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO), once a part of the Sinaloa Federation, the remaining Beltran Leyva brother Hector (see section on Cartel Pacifico Sur below) believes that Guzman betrayed his brothers and used the government to remove a potential challenger — the BLO. This was borne out by events in the first quarter of 2011, when Sinaloa expanded into the territories of cartels that were fragmented or floundering such as its New Federation allies La Familia Michoacana (LFM) and the Independent Cartel of Acapulco (CIDA). “Divide and conquer” works, even when a third party causes the fragmentation, and Guzman knows this well.

Knights Templar

As was discussed in STRATFOR’s 2010 annual cartel report, the death of Nazario “El Mas Loco” Moreno Gonzalez in a shootout with federal authorities on Dec. 9, 2010, was a blow to LFM. Moreno was a charismatic and compelling leader, around whom grew a curious blend of religious cult, merciless killing machine and highly specialized drug-trafficking organization. Without Moreno’s centrally focused leadership, the bands of LFM killers fractured and seemed to engage in directionless violence in late December and into January.
LFM continued to devolve with the loss of its methamphetamine labs to government takedowns (and probably efforts by other cartels as well). As with the territorial grabs in other parts of Mexico, LFM’s leaderless cells did not hold onto the bulk of the cartel’s smuggling routes but likely lost them to regional hegemon Sinaloa. At this point in the degeneration of the organization, it is likely that the faithful core of Moreno’s followers saw the need to reorganize or rebrand the group in order to reunify its scattered elements. Such an effort at organizational self-preservation would require a particular sort of leader to fill the void left by Moreno’s death.
As with most charismatic pseudo-religious organizations and their inherent strongman leadership, there was a fiercely loyal cadre of lieutenants who surrounded Moreno. From that group alone will be found a successor who will be followed, since most of the LFM rank and file will align themselves only with someone who has complete faith in Moreno’s teachings. In the chaos of last December, following Moreno’s death, the two top members of his inner circle were rumored to have fled the country. STRATFOR has been unable to confirm the rumor (or, if it is true, whether they have returned), but the two — Servando “La Tuta” Gomez Martinez and Jose Jesus “El Chango” Mendez Vargas — are the prime candidates to replace Moreno and bring the elements of LFM back together. They fit the mold for being the most likely to succeed in the reconstitution and rebranding of the group.
LFM announced its dissolution in January. Authorities and analysts dismissed the announcement and waited to see what evolved. The wait was not very long. On March 17, banners appeared in multiple cities and villages in Michoacan that proclaimed the presence of a previously unknown group — Los Caballeros Templar, aka the Knights Templar.
The new name may have triggered a few chuckles in some agencies — and objections from members of the Sovereign Military Order of the Temple of Jerusalem, which traces its origins to the original Knights Templar, an order of Christian knights formed to protect pilgrims traveling to the Holy Land during the First Crusade. There is some parallel to the religion-centric LFM, with its stated goals of protecting the people of Michoacan from criminal elements, including corrupt government officials.
Banners announcing the emergence of the Knights Templar in Michoacan read: “To the people of Michoacan, we inform you that starting today we will be carrying out here the altruistic activities previously realized by La Familia Michoacana. We will be at the service of the people of Michoacan to attend to any situation that threatens the safety of Michoacanos. Our commitment is to: keep order; avoid robberies, kidnappings, extortion; and protect the state from possible (interventions) by rival organizations. — The Knights Templar.”
The Knights Templar banners bore the same type of message and tone as previous LFM banners, which suggests that the activities of the Knights Templar in the next few months will likely be consistent with documented LFM activities. This development is recent, and information regarding the composition of the group, its leadership and its relations with remnant LFM cells and the Sinaloa Federation is very sparse. STRATFOR will continue to monitor events in Michoacan over the next quarter, paying particular attention to the emergence of the Knights Templar leadership and the reconstitution of LFM alliances and business, enforcement and smuggling operations. It is too soon to know whether the former LFM partnership with the Sinaloa Federation will be reinstituted.

Cartel Pacifico Sur

The groups that evolved from the factions of the BLO no longer are recognizable as such. The BLO split into two separate groups, with an unknown number of BLO operatives electing to return to the Sinaloa Federation rather than join either of the two new drug-trafficking organizations.
The first of these two independent groups, Cartel Pacifico Sur (CPS), centers around Hector Beltran Leyva and is allied with Los Zetas. During the first quarter of 2011, CPS demonstrated an addition to its skill set: the use of an improvised explosive device (IED) placed in a car in Tula, Hidalgo state, with an anonymous call to local law enforcement to lure victims to the booby trap. The small device detonated on Jan. 22 when one of the vehicle’s doors was opened, injuring four police officers.
Though no one claimed responsibility for the IED, a connection can be made that suggests CPS involvement. Last summer, STRATFOR discussed the use of an IED in a car in Juarez in which the first responders were targeted and killed following an anonymous call regarding a wounded police officer. That IED is believed to have been detonated by members of the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes cartel (VCF, aka the Juarez cartel). In both the Juarez and Tula bombings, the devices used were small, composed of industrial hydrogel explosives and placed in vehicles to which local police were lured by some ruse.
The common denominator is likely Los Zetas. Though the cities of Juarez and Tula are about 1,600 kilometers (1,000 miles) apart, and the Juarez cartel and CPS do not share assets, both organizations are allied with Los Zetas — and Los Zetas have members with military demolitions training. In the coming months, STRATFOR will be watching for any other indicators that this connection has led to other permutations in CPS tactics previously not associated with the BLO.

Independent Cartel of Acapulco

The second group that broke off from the BLO is the Independent Cartel of Acapulco (Cartel Independiente de Acapulco, or CIDA). This group is still evolving and information about it remains rather muddled. At this point, STRATFOR has identified CIDA as a large part of the BLO faction loyal to Edgar “La Barbie” Valdez Villarreal. Since Valdez Villarreal was arrested in September 2010, his faction has apparently become somewhat marginalized. Some CIDA members came from La Barbie’s faction, some did not. There are also some former LFM elements in the CIDA as well as a handful of miscellaneous Acapulco street thugs and miscreants. There continues to be sporadic violence attributable to, or claimed by, the CIDA, but there is mounting evidence that the organization is fading from the picture in some areas.
That said, the CIDA is not giving up without a fight. STRATFOR sources recently indicated that the group is locked in a battle with CPS for control of the city of Cuernavaca, Morelos state. Sources say CPS gunmen currently control the east side of Cuernavaca and CIDA operatives control the city’s west side. Particularly dangerous areas are the Jiutepec sector on the city’s southeast side and the Carolina neighborhood on the west side.
According to Mexican media reports, federal police arrested Benjamin “El Padrino” Flores Reyes, one of the suspected top CIDA leaders, on March 6 in Acapulco, Guerrero state. Flores Reyes reportedly controlled the distribution of drugs, managed the cartel’s lookout groups and is said to have reported directly to cartel chief Moises “El Koreano” Montero Alvarez.
The CIDA was aligned with LFM and the Sinaloa Federation, and until late last year it was most likely in control of the Acapulco plaza and seaport. The disbanded LFM, reincarnated into the Knights Templar, probably has not provided any help to the weakened CIDA, and Sinaloa has likely taken full advantage of the chaos and helped itself to the Acapulco plaza. STRATFOR has asked its sources which cartel controls the Acapulco seaport itself, and while conditions are sufficiently murky to prevent any definitive answers, the working hypothesis is that the port is also in the hands of Sinaloa.
Currently, the CIDA is at war with former ally Sinaloa, likely triggered by Guzman’s move to take CIDA territory after the arrest of Valdez Villarreal. The CIDA appears to be taking a beating on that front. During President Calderon’s visit to Acapulco last month, five dismembered bodies were found in front of a department store on Farallon Avenue in Acapulco. The discovery was made about an hour after Calderon opened the 36th Tourist Marketplace trade fair in the International Center of Acapulco. Pieces of two of the bodies were scattered on the ground near an abandoned SUV, and body parts from the other three were found in plastic bags inside the vehicle. Messages left at the scene said the victims were police officers killed by the Sinaloa Federation because they worked with the CIDA.
The outlook for the CIDA over the next three to six months is not promising. Unless something occurs to revitalize the group, such as a successful escape from prison by Valdez Villarreal, the CIDA may fade into obscurity within the year. Certainly the next three months will be telling.

Arellano Felix Organization

Fernando “El Ingeniero” Sanchez Arellano, nephew of the founding Arellano Felix brothers, is still in control of the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO, aka the Tijuana cartel), though the group is only a shadow of its former self. Little changed in the cartel’s condition in the first quarter of 2011 from how it was described in the 2010 annual cartel report. Sinaloa’s “partnership agreement” with the AFO has relegated the once-mighty Tijuana cartel to vassal status, with the bulk of its former territory and all of its smuggling avenues across the border now controlled by the Sinaloa Federation. The AFO now pays Sinaloa for access to its former territory.

Vicente Carrillo Fuentes Organization

The Vicente Carrillo Fuentes organization (VCF, aka the Juarez cartel) is holding on. Though STRATFOR has previously reported that the VCF was hemmed in on all sides by the Sinaloa cartel, and essentially confined to the downtown area of Ciudad Juarez, recent reports from STRATFOR sources indicate that this is not quite the case. The VCF retains control of the plaza and the border crossings in Juarez, from the Paso Del Norte port of entry on the northwest side to the Ysleta port of entry on the west side of town. However, the VCF’s territory is significantly diminished to the extent that it no longer controls the city of Chihuahua, which is now held by Sinaloa, as is the rest of Chihuahua state and the border zone on both sides of Juarez/El Paso.
As we have discussed in previous cartel reports, VCF second-in-command Vicente Carrillo Leyva has been in Mexican federal custody since his arrest in Mexico City in 2009. He is the son of Amado Carrillo Fuentes, founder of the cartel, and nephew of the current leader (and cartel namesake) Vicente Carrillo Fuentes. On March 15, Carrillo Leyva was formally charged with money laundering, which diminishes the possibility of his eventual release. Given how long he has been detained and the foibles of the Mexican legal system, Carrillo Leyva may yet be released, but it seems doubtful at present.
In the absence of Carrillo Leyva, his right-hand man, Juan “El JL” Luis Ledezma, has been acting as the No. 2 in the organization, running the cartel’s operations and those of its enforcement arm, La Linea. But one of the other high-ranking VCF leaders has been taken out of the mix. On Feb. 22, Luis Humberto “El Condor” Peralta Hernandez was killed during a gunbattle with federal police in Chihuahua City, which removed the leader of the network holding open the cartel’s supply lines. As it stands now, STRATFOR sources indicate that most of the contraband seized by law enforcement on the U.S. side of the border with Chihuahua state is owned by Sinaloa, not the VCF, though the percentage remains unclear.
The VCF is surrounded by Sinaloa-held territory. Barring an unlikely reversal of Sinaloa’s fortunes, such as a massive operation by Los Zetas/VCF with all their allied gangs that successfully routs Sinaloa, the VCF is facing slow strangulation as its supply lines close and its revenue streams dry up. This will not happen overnight or even within the next three months, but as the noose tightens we can expect violence in Juarez to skyrocket beyond its current record-breaking level because the VCF will not go quietly.
In the short term, the inability to move narcotics will cause the VCF to continue to seek operational funding through other means, such as kidnapping, extortion, alien smuggling and cargo theft. We have seen indications of that with a couple of recent nightclub shootings that are thought to have been associated with VCF extortion rackets. As hard as it might be to imagine, the violence in Juarez may actually get worse.